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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HANCE A. TAYLOR, and ERMA G. 
TAYLOR, his wife, and PARLEY 
P. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs and .Appellants, 
vs. 
WEBER COUNTY, a municipal cor-
poration, LYMAN HESS, ARTHUR 
BROWN, ELMER CARVER, J. 
PIERCE GRAHAM, ELLIS GRIFFIN 
and GOLDEN NIELSEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CORRECTION OF APPELLANTS' 
STATMEiNT OF FACTS 
While appellant's statement of facts is accurate in 
most particulars, it is incorrect in several matters which 
are very material. We shall consider these briefly. 
First, appellants in the first paragraph of their 
Statement of Facts on page 2 give an incorrect state-
ment as to how and why the drain was cleaned. 
The evidence at the trial was that Weber County 
had at all times, and particularly while the present re-
spondents wer'e agents of the County, maintained that 
Weber County had an absolute right to clean, drain 
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through, and otherwise Inaintain the drain through 
the Taylor property, as will be discussed in Respond-
nt's Statement of Facts. Counsel give the im-
pression that th'e purpose of cleaning the drain was 
to drain an existing swamp and pond to the north of 
the Taylor property. This is not correct. The purpose 
was to clean out the drain so that water naturally flow-
ing from the saucerlike area to the north of the ap-
pellants' property, and which had so flowed during the 
lifetime of all the witnesses, could continue to flow and 
not pond up along tile County road drains on Center 
Street and make swamps on farms in th drainage area 
(T. 128, 129). 
Appellants' brief on page 2 indicates the water had 
been backing against and over the newly constructed 
highway, known as Center Street-and that it was to 
protect this highway that the drain was built. This is 
not correct. The old graveled road of Center Street, 
according to testimony, had, of course, been there for 
more years than anyone could remember. The new, 
hard-surfaced highway was not constructed until the 
summer of 1954, a year after the County cleaned the 
drain (T. 128). Appellants attempt to show that there 
had been some prior n'egotiation concerning the widen-
ing and deepning of the drain through the Taylor pro-
perty before November 20, 1953. This gives an in-
correct inference which will be discuss'ed near the last 
of Point I of respondents' brief. 
Second, appellants' brief on page 2 states that the 
respondents cut the fence of Hance Taylor to get on 
and clean the drain. Hance Taylor stated that the place 
where the dragline came through his property was 
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fenced with four wir'es and cedar posts (T. 20). He 
admitted on cross-examination that he never saw the 
fence on the north of his property where the dragline 
was supposed to have come through when it was down; 
that at all tim'es when he saw it during and after the 
time the drag line was there, the fence was up ( T. 32). 
Mr. Taylor acknowledged that the fence on the north 
end of this property through which th dragline entered 
his prop'erty was owned half by Lester and Merl 
England, brothers, and half by himself ( T. 44, 45). 
Lester England stated he was familiar with the place 
where the dragline had gone from th England property 
onto the Taylor property, and said there was no fence 
standing th'ere at the time; that his nephew, while clean-
ing the ditch, set a brush fire and burned the fence out; 
that the wire was lying flat on the ground, and that the 
dragline went into the Taylor property where the fence 
was laid down. (T. 200, 201) 
Third, on page 4 of appellants' brief, last paragraph, 
appellants mention the damage done to the property of 
appellants by trespass of respondents and state that 
the "results of cutting and washing away plaintiffs' 
ground was not controverted by defendants". This, of 
course, is not a correct statement, as will clearly be 
shown in respondents' Statement of Facts by their 
witnesses and by admission of appellants. 
Fourth, the first paragraph on page 5 of appellants' 
brief makes an incorrect statement of respondents' vi'ews 
and of the drain history. These will also be correctly 
set out in respondents' Statement of Facts. 
Fifth, on page 6, appellants state that none of de-
fendants' witnesses testified that they had gone onto the 
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Taylor farms without seeking perm1sswn from the 
Taylors to so do. This is, first, a misleading statement 
because no one of defendants' witnesses ever testified 
he had asked for permission to clean the drain, but 
merely related the things that he did in cleaning it; and 
it is, secondly, an incorrect statement as several of 
defendants' witnsses made direct statements to the effect 
that they had cleaned the drain without asking for per-
mission from the Taylors. These instances will be 
clearly pointed out in respondents' Statement of Facts. 
Sixth, on page 7, appellants state that a Weber 
County Commissioner Randall in 1928 and a Commis-
sioner McEntire in 1943 agreed to tile the drain through 
the Taylor farm if the County were given permission 
to enter the farms to cl'ean the drains. Appellants state 
this was not denied by the defendants. This claim of 
lack of denial leaves an erroneous impression of the 
facts. Both Commissioners picked to have made thes'e 
ditchbank agreements without any known record thereof 
and without knowledge or concurrence of the other Com-
missioners, were Commissioners who were dead at the 
time this law suit started and not available to make 
denial. 
Seventh, on page 7, appellants further speak of a 
1948 meeting in the County Building with the County 
Commissioners in which the County attempted to ac-
quire a right-of-way through the Taylor farm. This 
will be discussed at the last of Point No. I of respond-
ents' brief. 
Eighth, on page 8, appellants quote Commissioner 
Carver as saying that when the drain was cleaned, the 
Commission'ers were not acting under the direction of 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the farmers in the vicinity. This is not a correct in-
terpretation of Mr. Carver's statement, as will be 
pointed out in respondents' argument of Point IV of 
their brief. 
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Early Drain History 
Appellants Hance A. and Erma G. Taylor, his wife, 
from 1946 and up to and including the time of this 
action, were the owners of a long, narrow strip of land 
lying in Plain City in Weber County, Utah. The strip 
was 3791;2 fe'et wide by 1,452 feet long, running in length 
north and south Appellant Parley P. Taylor owned the 
land adjoining the Hance Taylor property on the south, 
his land being the same width but considerably shorter. 
For as far back as any of the parties to the action could 
remember, this narrow strip of land running between 
the farm lands on the east and west had been a low 
natural swale in which drainage water ran through the 
bottom land (T. 183). As long as fifty-five years ago, 
it was remembered as a meadow running from 'each 
side of the property down towards this swale where 
the water was running (T. 184). The channel now known 
as the Taylor drain was originally the bottom of this 
long, narrow swale. The drain hel'e in question starts 
at approximately the Center Street road and drains the 
drain along that road and then runs south between the 
Baker and England property about 80 rods to the ap-
pellants' property, th'en through their property and a 
considerable distance beyond to a creek known as Four 
Mile. The drain, and particularly its head near Center 
Street, is the center and low point of a tremendous 
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natural valley lying west, north, and east of this swale 
and containing in this drainage area between 1,200 and 
2,000 acres of land ( T. 193, 194). 
Commissioner Carver spoke of this saucerlike area 
as one draining water from practically every direction 
(T. 107). At trial, the testimony was undisputed that 
this Taylor drain drained an area going east between 
one-half and one mile to Farr West, and going west at 
least a mile to the Robins on property on the Clearfield 
Road (T. 40, 41, 42) and north of the Center Street 
road onto the Christensen property (T. 193, 130, 
131). The only deviations from these statements were 
that appellants and their counsel throughout the trial 
spoke of ponds and lakes up to the north of Center 
Street which in times past drained through this area. 
These were not remembered by witnesses for respond-
ents except as to ponds built up near the Center Street 
head of the drain when the drain became clogged :every 
few years. 
Mr. England, in describing the area of land that 
this drain carried the water away from, stated that when 
the drain becomes clogged with rushes and weeds, that 
the water backs up in the drain north under the Center 
Street road into Ted Christensen's pasture, and that 
if the drain is not kept open, the water will gradually 
fill up the whole pasture (T. 203). He stated that two 
or three years before the trial, when the drain was not 
properly cleaned, it backed up and caused a pond in 
Christensen's pasture large enough to row a boat on. 
It stayed there approximately six weeks (T. 207). He 
stated that approximately twenty-five years ago, there 
was a pond across Center Street at the head of the 
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drain in Christensen's pasture, and that there was more 
or less a perman·ent pond there when the drain became 
full of reeds and weeds, but when they cleaned the drain, 
no water stayed in there (T. 208, 209). 
Lester England testified that he personally remem-
bered the land when it was just a swale (T. 216). He 
remembered the Taylor drain for a period of at least 
fifty-five years (T. 183). At that tim·e, in the center of 
the swale, there was approximately a three foot ditch 
which they cleaned out with teams and scrapers (T. 217). 
Mr. England further testified that thirty, forty, or fifty 
years ago, the early owners of the Taylor land started 
pulling and scraping dirt down from the sides of this 
narrow strip of land and up to the sides of the ditch, 
thereby cutting down the high sides of the land and 
filling in the swampy, meadowy edges of the swale. This 
action, along with the scraping out of the channel, made 
a definite drain in the center of the swale where origin-
ally it had just been a natural bed. The leveling of the 
surrounding high land down to the edges of the drain 
made it so that the sides and the banks of the drain were 
higher than normal. This was done so that the land 
could be used right up to the edges of the drain as 
cultivated farm land rather than just pasturage in the 
rolling swale ( T. 183, 184, 185). 
The appellant Hance Taylor testified that the reason 
the channel was originally dug in the location where the 
drain is now was because originally there was a small 
swale going through there. He remembered seeing them 
cut wild hay across there ( T. 312). 
This action by the early owners prevented the entire 
swale from being the natural course of drainage and 
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channeled it instead into this one drain. l\Ir. England 
further stated that the Etngland property which Iirs 
north and east of the Taylor property and the Taylor 
master drain, had drained into the drain along Center 
Street and west into this master drain through the 
Taylor farm for at least seventy-five years (T. 186). 
Appellant Hance Taylor admitted that there was 
an eight or ten inch tile drain running across his prop-
erty from the west over to the main Taylor drain and 
draining water from an open drain cmning from about 
one mile west through the Lawrence Stander and 
Robinson properties. He stated that he had never been 
to the end of this open drain, so he didn't know just 
how far it went. His estimate was that this tile drain 
through his property was far enough underground so 
that it came into the main Taylor drain approximately 
six inches from the bottom (T. 40, 41, 42, 43). It was 
testified that there is also a 4 inch tile drain buried under 
the Hance Taylor farm and running from the west into 
the Taylor drain (T. 109·, 110, 116, 117). No witnesses 
at the trial, including appellant Hance Taylor, could 
recollect when these two tile drains were placed under 
the Taylor farm. 
Mr. Lester England testified there is another drain 
draining into the Taylor drain from the east just north 
of the appellants' properties. He stated that this drain 
came from approximately one mile east in a group of 
sloughs in Farr West and ran down through a natural 
swale almost to the present Taylor drain; that it then 
went north to Center Street into the Center Street drain, 
then west a very short distance through the Center 
Street drain to a point where it joined the Taylor drain, 
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and then ran south through the present Taylor drain. 
He said that about the time of the great flu epidemic 
in 1920, Ether Taylor, brother of appellant Parley 
Taylor, filled up this natural drain so that the land 
over it could be farmed. A Mr. Bell, whose property 
was up by Ether Taylor's property, threatened to start 
a law suit against Ether for filling up the drain. The 
drain was then reopened by agreement of the parties, 
allowing the water to flow naturally down toward the 
Taylor drain, and Weber County at that time, with its. 
dragline and at the request of the parties then involved, 
cut the end of the drain through Wilford England's 
property so that it ran directly west from Ether Taylor's 
property into the Taylor master drain, where it now 
runs, without going into it by way of the Center Street 
drain (T. 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182 and 314). 
Taylor Drain History During the Last 35 Years 
Mr. England testified that he had an early r'ecollec-
tion of the County using power equipment in the drain, 
and that a man by the name of Louie Shummers, in ap-
proximately 1918 or 1920, drove the first dragline for 
Weber County through this drain when Mr. Skeen's 
father was Road Supervisor ( T. 191, 192). 
Delwin Sharp, the Road Supervisor for Weber 
County for the District of Plain City, stated that in ap-
proximately 1918, he went along the drain in question 
for Weber County and dug out the drain to its approxi-
mate present width and depth. At that time, just north 
of the appellant's property, he put in a cement and tile 
culvert under the canal for the drain to run through 
and while cleaning out the drain, he put in two other 
concrete culverts, one on the Hance Taylor property 
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and one on th'e Parley Taylor property (T. 226 to 229). 
Weber County did this work, furnished the 1naterials, 
and paid for all the labor. He stated that the two cul-
verts which he placed in the appellants' property are 
still there in the same position in the drains where he 
placed them. He stated that the drain might be six 
inches to twelve inches wider now than it was then. lllr. 
Sharp made it clear that he cleaned the drain at that 
time without obtaining permission from the Taylors. 
He went on to say that the fellow who owned the ground 
at the time, John H. Taylor, was there, and that he was 
hired, along with Ether Taylor, to work for the County 
in cleaning the drain. 
Mr. Sharp added that he acted just on the County 
Commissioners' instructions ( T. 231, 232). 
Ernest Jensen testified that he cleaned the entire 
Hance and Parley Taylor drain in approximately 1928 
at the instruction of the County Commissioners; that at 
that time, he saw Parley Taylor out near the drain, but 
that he had no conversation with him (T. 240-241). He 
stated that he cleaned the drain with a County dragline 
from a levee near the south part of appellant Parley 
Taylor's land north up through Parley's land and 
through Hance Taylor's land up to Center Street. He 
dropped the cleanings from the drain up on the bank 
and left them there. He stated that he saw the culverts 
put in by Delwin Sharp, that he cleaned the drain down 
to a point level with the bottom of them so that the water 
ran straight through, and that he cleaned out any 
bumps which went above the level between the bottoms 
of the culv·erts ( T. 236, 237, 238, & 212, 213). 
Mr. Jesse Singleton stated that in 1933, he went up 
10 
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the ditch for Weber County with a shovel and pitchfork 
and cleaned out the rubbish (T. 244, 245). 
In 1935, the Weber County Mosquito Abatement 
Project cleaned the drain again (T. 245, 246). At that 
time, they put in some new pipes in the drain coming 
from the west into the Taylor drain from the Stander 
property where the pipes had apparently been broken 
(T. 252, 253). 
Mrs. Delilah Taylor U rry (prior owner of appellant 
Hance Taylor's land) stated that the W. P. A. cleaned 
the drain with approximately twenty-five men (T. 302). 
Mrs. Urry, on direct examination, indicated that when 
the W. P. A. cleaned the drain, "they came in and asked 
us if they could go through" (T. 301). On cross-ex-
amination of Mrs. U rry concerning whether permission 
was requested by the W. P. A. to clean the drain, it 
became clear that the only permission requested was to 
go through several of her gates down on the south end 
of her property to get up to the drain (T. 302, 303). 
Mr. Lester Elllgland testified that in approximately 
1933, the P. W. A. (probably referring to the same group 
as Mrs. Urry's W. P. A.) cleaned this drain, starting at 
Four Mile Creek on the south, running all the way up 
through the Taylor property, and up to and including 
the England property (T. 192). At that time, they 
sloped the banks in a semi-round condition, as shown 
in plaintiff's Exhibit C photograph. They moved in 
with approximately five hundred men and stationed 
them six to eight feet apart with shovels, and made the 
drain the same as it is today. He stated that the drain 
is the same now as it was when the P. W. A. finished 
11 
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with it as to width and depth (T. 201, 202). 
Mr. Jessie Singleton stated in approximately 1938 
he went through the drain again, as Weber County's 
Supervisor, and had the rushes cut out and hauled off. 
He hired appellant Parley Taylor and his son to help 
with this work. He showed his County time book (de-
fendants Exhibit 5), where he had credited their time 
for work on this job. They were paid for the work by 
Weber County under his supervision (T. 247, 248, 249 & 
259). Mr. Singleton stated that again in 1943, he took 
the County dragline and cleaned part of the Hance 
Taylor drain - a part just north of Parley Taylor's 
which was clogged ( T. 251, 252, 254). He stated that 
when he did this job, he did not ask permission from the 
Taylors to do it (T. 255). 
Commissioner Lyman Hess testified that in ap-
proximately 1944, which was possibly the last time 
spoken of by Mr. Singleton, he, as Commissioner, had 
the Taylor drain cleaned through all of appellant Hance 
Taylor's property, but stated that it did not need clean-
ing down in Parley Taylor's farm because of the fall 
(T. 261, 262). At that time, he cleaned down to the 
bottom level of the drain that came into the Taylor 
drain from the west ( T. 261, 262). He testified that he 
went onto the drain without permission from anyone, 
but discussed the spreading of the sediment with Emry 
Taylor ( T. 264, 265, 267, 268). 
The evidence introduced, including the statement 
of appellant Hance Taylor (T. 56), was that by the fall 
of 1953, this drain again had filled up with sediment, 
rushes, and other brush far above the level of the bottom 
of the culverts (placed there in 1918 by Delwin Sharp). 
12 
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The Commissioners had been advised by appellants that 
they could not clean the drain this time unless they 
agreed to tile it. The Center Street road near the head 
of the drain on the north end had been flooded the year 
before, and they had been repeatedly requested by Mr. 
Lester England, owner of the property on the north of 
the Taylor land, and by Mr. Christensen and Mr. Gibby, 
who also own land on the north, to clean this drain 
(T. 323, 324, 325, 204, 205, 206). Approximately ten 
days before the drain was cleaned, the County Com-
missioners sent a letter to appellants' (plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit B), advising them that they intended to exercise 
their right-of-way and clean the drain. The respond-
ents', on November 20, 1953, moved the dragline down 
the drain and along their bank right-of-way and cleaned 
the drain. 
No Damage in Drain Cleaning 
At trial, the respondents elected to try the case 
solely on the question of whether or not respondents 
have a right to clean the drain and whether or not they 
exceeded that right. It was clearly shown at trial by 
testimony of both appellants and respondents that no 
actual damage had been done by the respondents In 
cleaning the drain. 
Commissioner Carver stated that the drain was 
approximately the same now as it was in 1920 (T. 131, 
132). 
Mr. England stated that twenty-five years ago, 
the drain was the same as now, except that theW. P. A. 
sloped the banks (T. 210, 211, 214). 
Mr. Sharp stated that in 1918, he widened and deep-
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ened the drain into approximately its present position 
(T. 228). 
Commissioner Hess stated the drain was no bigger 
after cleaning it in 1953 than it was after he had cleaned 
it in 1944 (T. 262). 
Appellant Hance Taylor, after testifying to the 
severe damage done to his property by the cleaning of 
the drain, on cross-examination repeatedly testified that 
after the drain was cleaned, it was not necessarily too 
much wider, it just went deeper. He further testified 
that it caved in some years ago (T. 21, 23, 24). 
Commissioner Carver stated that after the drain 
was cleaned, he talked to appellant Hance Taylor about 
it and Hance said that the damage hadn't been done now, 
but wait until the water runs through (T. 322). 
Lester England testified that he had gone over 
the drain just before the trial and he couldn't see any 
place where the drain had sluffed in from the sides 
(T. 198, 220). 
Mr. E. Paul Gilgen, Weber County Surveyor, testi-
fied that he made a complete survey of the drain just 
before the trial and that he had taken cross-sections 
every one hundred feet down the drain to show the cross-
sectional picture of the drain banks and the drain 
bottom (T. 140). 
He stated that the average depth of the Taylor 
drain was four feet. He presented a graph (defendants' 
Exhibit 4) showing a profile of the drain. The green 
average line on this map was the average elevation of 
the east and west banks (T. 148). The red line below 
the green line represented an imaginary straight line 
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drawn between the inside bottoms of the pre-existing 
culverts in the drain. Mr. Gilgen called it the flow line 
of the pipes and culverts as they sat in the drain (T. 150, 
153). Mr. Gilgen described the first of these culverts 
as lying approximately 100 feet south from Hance 
Taylor's north property line fence, the second one as 
being near the south end of the Hance Taylor property, 
and the third one being on the Parley Taylor property. 
He stated that all of these pipes were in the bottom of 
the drain as shown on defendants' Exhibit 4 (T. 152). 
These culverts used by Mr. Gilgen in determining the 
flow line of the drain were the same ones pointed out 
by Mr. Delwin Sharp as the ones placed in the drain by 
him in 1918 for Weber County and which he described 
as being in the same position now that they were in at 
the time he placed them there ( T. 226, 228). 
The two culverts on the Hance Taylor property 
were located in the bottom of this four foot drain with 
dirt piled above them to the level of the land. Mr. 
Hance Taylor stated that over the top ?f the south 
culvert on his property the dirt was piled up two feet 
deep to make it level across there for a private road 
(T. 35, 36, 38). He stated that above the north culvert 
there would be about three feet of dirt (T. 40). He 
clearly established that these were permanently estab-
lished culverts and ones not apt tto shift or sink. Mr. 
England corroborates Mr. Gilgen's statements concern-
ing flow lin~s in his testimony on pages 202, 203. 
Mr. Gilgen then testified that the black horizontal 
line on defendants' Exhibit 4 represented the actual 
elevation line of the bottom of the drain at the time he 
made his survey (T. 153, 154). His survey, as shown 
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on defendants' Exhibit 4, showed that the drain was 
cleaned out generally just down to the natural flow line 
of the drain as it was finally dug in 1918. ~Ir. Gilgen 
stated there was a small section just south of the north 
corrugated metal pipe on the Hance Taylor property 
where the drain at the time of his survey was slightly 
below the red line. At this point, the actual drain 
bottom was approximately one inch below the red aver-
age flow line between the culverts. 
The only other place on either of the appellants' 
land where the drain, as surveyed by Mr. Gilgen, was 
lower than the average flow line drawn between the 
prior existing pipes and culverts, was down on appellant 
Parley Taylor's property, just before the drain enters 
the tweny-four inch tile and corrugated metal pipe, 
(the point being described as fifteen to twenty-five feet 
north of station 37, plus 13, shown on defendants' Ex-
hibit 4). At the head of this culvert for a very short 
distance, as shown on Exhibit 4, the drain was approxi-
mately three inches below the average flow line (T. 159). 
In all other places along the drain, it was not cleaned 
down below what Engineer Gilgen computed to be the 
prior existing average flow line. 
l\ir. Gilgen's survey further showed that the actual 
present bottom of the drain was between one and two 
inches below the visible bottom of the eight inch drain 
running into the Taylor drain from the west (T. 156, 
157), and that the actual bottom of the drain at this 
point where the eight inch pipe entered it was still, after 
having been dredged out by respondents, four to five 
inches above the natural flow line of the drain (T. 160). 
The jury was taken out to and allowed to view the drain. 
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STATE~MENT OF POINTS 
The respondents will answer and argue the five 
points posed by appellants in the order set forth and 
argued in appellants' brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
Appellants' Contention that the Trial Court 
Erred in its Refusal to Grant Plaintiffs' Motion 
for a Directed Verdict as to Liability at the Close 
of all the Eividence. 
Respondents' answer to this contention is that the 
trial court properly refused to grant plaintiffs' motion 
for directed verdict as to liability. Plaintiffs' case was 
based solely on the question of trespass to real property. 
The evidence of the appellants did not, as appellants' 
counsel suggest, conclusively show that they were the 
owners and in possession of that portion of the land 
known as the Taylor drain. Respondents' evidence re-
ceived from witnesses for respondents and by admissions 
of appellants, disproved this claimed ownership and 
possession of the drain. Respondents' evidence estab-
lished three controverting facts: 
(a) The drain in question was originally the 
natural course of drainage for the saucerlike area sur-
rounding the point of origin of the drain near Center 
Street, and the natural drainage, although channeled by 
early land owners, members of the community and 
Weber County, has been actually maintained in the same 
location as a course of drainage by the people of the 
community and Weber County for a period of at least 
75 years. 
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(b) Weber County has by open, notorious, hostile, 
adverse use and possession, with the knowledge of the 
appellant landowners and under claim of right, main-
tained a right-of-way through the property of appel-
lants to clean thrs master drain when needed and to allow 
water from other parts of the county within the natural 
drainage area to run through the drain. 
(c) Two original owners of land lying immedi-
ately north of appellants' land paid appellants' pre-
decessor in interest, John Taylor, for the right to have 
their drainage water run down this channel and to 
maintain the channel so that it might properly do so. 
This right continued down to the time the drain was 
clean'ed by respondents. Respondents, in cleaning the 
drain, did so at the express request and instruction 
and under the authorization of the successors in interest 
of these landowners who purchased this right. 
In denying plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict, 
the trial court was guided, and properly so, by the 
general law and the law of the State of Utah. The 
writer in 53 American Juris prudence, Trials, Sec. 332, 
discusses the general law: 
" . . . if there is conflict in the evidence, parti-
cularly when the evidence consists of oral testi-
mony, if different inferences may reasonably be 
drawn from the evidence or if the court would be 
called to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses 
or their testimony, the court should not and ordi-
narily will not direct a verdict." 
This court discusses the Utah law in A. W. Sewell 
Company v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Company, 
15 P. (2nd) 327, 80 Ut. 378: 
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"The rule is well established in this state by a 
long list of authorities that where there is any 
substantial evidence upon which the jury could 
find for the plaintiff under the pleadings, the 
trial court must submit the issues to the jury and 
cannot direct a verdict . . . . . In determining 
this question, the evidence must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff." 
This statement of law was in a case where the 
defendant made the motion for a directed verdict, but 
applying it to plaintiffs' motion, it clearly shows that 
the motion should have been denied. The evidence 
establishing respondents' right-of-way and right to clean 
the drain in question without being liable in trespass 
is as set out at length in respondents' Statement of Facts. 
It appears clear from the testimony that the Taylor 
drain was the natural drain as described in respond-
ents' pretrial statement for the saucerlike area north 
of and surrounding the drain's point of origin near the 
Center Street road. The appellants' misinterpret the 
evidence on page 10 of their brief where they say that 
the natural drainage for the head of the Taylor drain 
was to the north. It is obvious from Mr. England's 
answer that he is referring to another drain (T. 195). 
In all of Mr. England's testimony, he makes it clear 
that the drainage from his place and all around him 
was and is to the south through the Taylor drain (T. 
203 204, 207, 208, 209, 186). His testimony on 
page 195, referred to by appellants on page 10, is 
slightly disconnected, but was clearly not intended by 
Mr. England to convey the idea that the natural drain-
age from the head of the Taylor drain was north. 
In ruling that appellants were not entitled to a 
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directed verdict, the court had before it respondents' 
evidence that Weber County had a right-of-way ac-
quired by prescriptive use of the drain for a period of 
more than twenty years. The evidence clearly nega-
tived the idea that this was a private drain. Appellants 
cite the cases of Bertolina vs. Frates, 89 Ut. 238, 57 P. 
(2d) 346; Jensen vs. Gerrard, 85 Ut. 481, 39 P. (2d) 1070; 
and Buckley vs. Cox, 274 P. (2d) 277 (Ut. 1952), a~ 
setting out the elements necessary for acquiring a right-
of-way by prescriptive use. Respondents have no ques-
tion but what these cases set out the law of Utah on 
this point. 
The evidence submitted by respondents at trial and 
admitted by witnesses for appellants clearly meets every 
burden of proof and all of the tests set forth by the 
Utah Supreme Court for establishing a right-of-way by 
prescriptive use. From the facts more fully stated be-
fore, it is clear that Weber County for more than thirty 
years has been cleaning and maintaining this drain, 
placing new culverts and pipes in it at its own expense 
and discretion. All of the work for more than thirty 
years was done openly, notoriously, and adversely to 
appellants. That it was done by Weber County under 
claim of right cannot be doubted. The fact that on two 
different occasions the early owners, and in fact ap-
pellant Parley Taylor hims·elf, worked under County 
supervision, direction and control and for its money in 
cleaning this drain, clearly establishes that Weber 
County's claim of right was open and adverse. This 
unrefuted testimony is clearly irreconcilable with any 
theory holding that the Taylor drain was merely a 
private drain used by and kept open by the appellants. 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It clearly discounts any claim that Weber County only 
cleaned the drain upon appellants' conditional permis-
sion. 
These regular cleanings, channelings, and acts of 
dominion over the drain over a period of more than 
thirty years prior to the entry here in question show an 
open, continuous and uninterrupted use by Weber 
County for more than the required prescriptive period, 
and clearly took away from the trial judge any right 
to determine as a matter or law that Weber County did 
not have and had not established a prescriptive right-
of-way over the Taylor drain. The evidence in this 
regard was clear, satisfactory and convincing that a 
right-of-way has 'existed and has been maintained and 
now exists. 
Appellants' brief at page 10 attributes to respond-
ents the claim that the County acquired a right-of-way 
through the general use of the drain by the people of 
the community for a period of years. This, of course, 
was not respondents' contention at trial, nor is it now. 
Appellants confuse the issues and the evidences pre-
sented at trial by what they label defendants' "Second 
Theory". Respondents had three theories at trial upon 
which evidence was presented: One was a right-of-way 
over the drain obtained by prescription; second was the 
sovereign right of the state and county governments to 
clean and allow water to run through a natural water-
way or course; and third, a right to clean the drain as 
agent of Lester England and the other landowners whose 
predecessors purchased this right. The general use of 
the drain by those in the natural drainage area was 
properly admitted to show a continuation of the 
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original natural drainage. 
On page 11 of their brief, appellants quote a portion 
of Commissioner Carver's testin1ony which they claim 
is an admission that the County in no way acted as the 
agent of someone ~else in cleaning the drain. The testi-
mony was correctly quoted, but it evidences a danger so 
often encountered when statements are taken out of 
context. Mr. Carver was not stating that Weber County 
was not in any way acting for Mr. England in cleaning 
the drain-he was just stating that primarily he was 
acting for the County, as will be later discussed under 
Point No. IV. 
Appellants' statement on page 12 of their brief that 
the "evidence, when read in conjunction with cross-ex-
amination and rebuttal testimony, conclusively shows 
that on each and every occasion when defendants entered 
the Taylor farm for the purpose of cleaning the drain, 
permission was sought and obtained or the entry was 
made without plaintiffs' knowledge" is, of course, not 
a correct statement of the facts, nor a proper analysis 
of the testimony, as shown by the transcript and the 
facts before set out. 
Counsel for appellants repeatedly attempted to 
establish that there had been some meeting between ap-
pellants and respondents in the City & County Building 
where the question of tiling the drain was discussed. On 
page 270 of their cross-examination, appellants at-
tempted to get Commissioner Hess to admit that he was 
present at a meeting, apparently with the Taylors. con-
cerning this drain, at the courthouse in Ogden in the 
year 1948, at which meeting Commissioner Brown and 
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Commissioner Stratford were supposed to have been 
present. Commissioner Hess' answer was that Com-
missioner Brown was not a Commission'er at that time 
and Commissioner Stratford had been dead for ten 
years, and, further, he recalled no such meeting when 
the matter of the drain across Parley Taylor's property 
was considered. Further ( T. 270, 271), Commissioner 
Hess stated he had searched the records and that there 
was no record of such a meeting. 
Respondents admitted that after 1949, there wer'e 
several attempts by the County Commissioners, indi-
vidually and collectively, to meet with the Taylors and 
determine what their problem was concerning the drain, 
but at no time did any of the commissioners present in 
court admit that there had been any type of agreement 
with the Taylors to tile their drain, nor had permission 
to clean the drain been requested by these Commission-
ers, nor had any permission been granted conditional 
upon Weber County tiling the drain, as far as any of 
these Commissioners knew (T. 272, 273). 
On cross-examination by Mr. Christensen, Com-
missioner Hess refuted the suggestion that in 1949 the 
County had asked the Taylors for permission to clean 
the drain (T. 277, 278). 
Appellant Parley Taylor, in attempting to show an 
instance where the County had asked for consent to 
clean the drain, stated that in about 1943, he had a con-
versation out on the drain with a Commissioner 
McEntire (deceased at time of trial) (T. 288). He stated 
that his brother John was there to discuss the matter 
with the Commissioner. After gentl'e leading by his 
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counsel, he recalled that his brother John died in 1929 
(T. 289). 
Parley Taylor stated that the County Commission-
ers as a body in their legally constituted meeting never 
contracted with him or agreed to tile his drain (T. 297). 
It is clear that the evidence of appellants satisfies 
in all particulars the requirements of the law and that 
the motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. 
POINT NO. II 
Appellants' Contention that the Trial Court 
Erred in its Instruction No. 3, which Quotes 
Verbatim from the Defendants' Pretrial State-
ment as to Theories of Defense Which are not 
Substantiated by any of the Evidence in the Case 
Respondents' answer to this contention of appellants 
is that the trial court properly exercised its discretion 
in its Instruction No. 3. 
The theories of the defense instructed upon in this 
instruction were fully and properly substantiated by 
the evidenc'e. Error is claimed here because the trial 
judge in part of one instruction quoted from a written 
statement made by the defendants upon court order 
after the pretrial hearing for the purpose of setting forth 
concisely what defendants' case would be at trial. No 
statement was made in the pretrial statement upon 
which evidenc'e was not then later introduced at trial. 
In summarizing plaintiffs' case, the trial court, al~· 
though not quoting at all times verbatim from plaintiffs' 
pleadings and pretrial statements, still give an instruct-
ion in setting out plaintiffs' claims which was more 
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generous to plaintiffs than their own evidence actually 
was. The trial court, although using a portion of de-
fendants' pretrial statement, still followed the rule laid 
down in Bruner vs. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P. (2d) 
649, by clearly defining the particular issues in the case 
and by specifically stating to the jury the material facts 
alleged, denied and admitted, and by clearly instructing 
the jury that its Instruction No. 2 was the position of 
the plaintiff and that Instruction No. 3 set out only the 
answer to that complaint by defendants. 
The appellants, on page 14 of their brief, state that 
the instruction recites four theories which tlle defend-
ants had proposed, "any one of which they felt would 
justify a finding of the acquisition of a right-of-way". 
This quoted statement was clearly not the statement of 
the court in its instructions, but is one formulated by 
tire appellants. It was not at any time during the trial 
the contention of the respondents. 
The points set out in the judge's Instruction No. 3 
and in defendants' pretrial information, although num-
bering from 1 to 4, set out only three theories of defens·e, 
not four, as appellants suggest. The first one is that 
the drain was originally the natural course of drainage 
for the saucerlike area around its point of origin and 
that it has continually been maintained as the natural 
drainage by the interested people in that area. 
The second theory was that Lester England's father 
and another early landowner, 0. J. Swenson, purchased 
from John Taylor, an original owner of app'ellants' 
property, the right to run their water through and to 
maintain the drain. This payment very possibly was 
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like the early payments of the United States to the Tri-
polian pirates to allow the United States to run their 
shipping through the Mediterranean Sea without being 
continually harassed, but however this money may have 
originally been paid, the rights either obtained or shored 
up were passed on down to the present landowners, in-
cluding Lester England. Any right obtained_by Weber 
County to clean the drain in N ovemb'er of 1953 at the 
request of Lester England would be as an agent or a 
servant of Lester England. No right-of-way at any 
time was claimed by respondents from this purchase 
for themselves. 
The portion of the pretrial statement quoted by the 
court in its instruction "that the people of the com-
munity" had maintained the drain for thirty-five to 
forty years was, of course, a fact clearly borne out by 
the respondents' evidence. The only correction should 
have been that it had been for a period of from thirty-
five to seventy-five years. This allegation would be 
material, as it clearly tends to show that appellants were 
not the owners and in possession of the actual drain 
running through their property and that said drain was 
not merely a private drain constructed by appellants 
for their own benefit, but was, rather, a natural public 
drain in which many people, including Weber County, 
held an interest. 
The argument of appellants at page 14 of their 
brief that paragraph 3 of Instruction No. 3 was sup-
ported by hearsay evidence only will be answered under 
Point No. V of this brief and will not be further com-
mented upon here. 
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Appellants' comment on page 15 of their brief that 
such evidence "if admissible, would not create a right-
of-way in Weber County absent a grant from 0. G. 
Swenson and Lester England's father or their successors 
in interest to Weber County" is, of course, admitted, 
as it has n'ever been the intention of respodents to claim 
a right-of-way by reason of the purchase of right-of-way 
by those early landowners. This argument by appel-
lants raises a point not maintained by respondents. 
Appellants' statement of Utah law in their citations 
from Bruner vs. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399; Farmers and 
Merchants Savings Bank vs. Jensen, 64 Utah 609; Davis 
vs. Hiener, 54 Utah 428; Hines vs. Gale, 25 Ariz. 65; 
and Shields vs. Utah Light & Traction Company, 99 Utah 
307, all cited in Bruner vs. McCarthy, properly set forth 
the law as quoted in those cases. Appellants have not, 
however, properly applied the law in those cases to the 
facts at hand. The case of Bruner vs. McCarthy, et al, in 
105 Utah 399, 142 P. (2d) 649, summarizes the estab-
lished Utah law on the question of the trial court read-
ing from the pleadings, adds tllereto a general rule on 
the matter to which the Utah court apparently sub-
scribes, and discusses also an Arizona ruling to which 
this court would subscribe. A digest of the majority 
opinion of this court in that case would be as follows: 
(1) It may be misleading, prejudicial and a reversi-
ble error for a trial court to merely read a verbatim 
statement of the complaint, answer and reply in lieu of 
giving a concise statement of the issues in the case to 
the jury. 
(2) It may be reversible error for a trial court to 
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read a long, involved pleading to the jury where there 
is no evidence to support some of the allegations made 
in the pleadings. 
(3) It may be a prejudicial error to read parts of 
pleadings relating to issues upon which no evidence has 
been introduced (Arizona law, possibly dicta here). 
( 4) It is better proctice, and the court should its'elf 
make a plain and concise statement in its own language 
of the issues to be determined by the jury, and should 
specifically state to them the material facts alleged, 
denied and admitted in respect to all of such issues, and 
the court should carefully omit any and all issues that 
may have been eliminated by the parties themselves or 
the court during or before the trial. 
( 5) While most jurisdictions frown on the practice 
of using the language of the various pleadings to sum-
marize the issues for the jury, the rule that reading the 
pleadings may or may not be error seems to meet with 
general approval. 
(6) Prejudice will not be presumed on appeal simply 
from a showing that the trial court failed to construe 
the pleadings and to charge the jury upon the issues. It 
does not necessarily follow that the losing party has 
been prejudiced simply because the trial court copied 
in his instructions and read to the jury the pleadings 
in the case instead of a statement of the issues in the 
language of the court. 
( 7) The burden rests on the complaining party to 
go further and point out to the court wherein and in 
what respect he has been prejudiced by the court's fail-
ure to define the issues and state to the jury the material 
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facts alleged, denied and admitted in the court's own 
words. 
The trial court in the case at hand neither ignored 
nor violated any of the rules of law summarized in the 
Brunner vs. McCarthy case. In this case, the trial 
court did not quote verbatim the entire complaint, 
answer or reply in giving its instruction to the jury, as 
was objectionable in Farmers and Merchants Savings 
Bank vs. Jensen, 64 Utah 609, 232 P. 1084, nor did the 
court read a long and involved pleading to the jury 
when there was no evidence to support some of the 
allegations made in the pleadings, as was objectionable 
in Shield vs. Utah Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah 307, 
105 P. (2d) 347. In quoting from respondents' pretrial 
statement, the court was not attempting to make a 
statement of all the issues in the case, but was only 
covering certain of defendants' claims, and in fact went 
on, in the court's own words, to further instruct on 
other of defendants' claims after having, in its own 
words, stated the grounds upon which plaintiffs were 
basing their case, and by so doing removed this instruct-
ion from the objections set out in the Davis vs. Hiener 
case, 54 Utah 428, 181 P. 587. The trial court in fact 
did make a plain and concis'e statement in its own lang-
uage of practically all of the issues to be determined 
by the jury, carefully admitting any and all issues that 
were eliminated by the parties themselves or by th'e court 
during the trial. Its incorporation in one part of In-
struction No. 3 of a part of defendants' pretrial state-
ment would not be prejudicial error. Appellants no-
where in their brief have pointed out in what respect 
they have been prejudiced, as is required under the 
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Bruner vs. 1\fcCarthy case above cited. This problem 
is discussed in 5 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 1763, at 
page 1113, where it states that "copying the pleadings, 
or reading them to the jury for the issues it not reversi-
ble error in the absence of prejudice". 
The only suggestion of error given by appellants 
is on page 16 of their brief, where they interpret the 
court's Instruction No. 3 as setting forth four possible 
theories upon which the jury could find an acquisition 
of right-of-way by Web'er County over the Taylors' 
farm. Instruction No. 3, of course, did not do this. It 
merely sets out the points and reasons for which the 
defendant allege and claim that Weber County lawfully 
cleaned the drain. The reading of a portion of a pre-
trial statement of this nature as part of an instruction 
should not be as subject to danger as the reading of the 
complaint, as appellants' suggest in their brief. The 
reason is that at this stage of the proceedings, all of 
the chaff should have been taken out of the matter. 
Counsel, at the court's instruction, should only have 
presented those things to the court by way of a pretrial 
statement that it was known could and would be sup-
ported at trial. 
Justice Wolfe's statement made in Bruner vs. 
McCarthy, quoted in the center of page 15 of appellants' 
brief, aptly summarizes the argument on this point under 
the facts of this case and it need not be again set out 
here. 
POINT NO. III 
Appellants' Contention that the Trial Court 
Erred in His Instruction No. 6, Setting Forth 
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"Basic Principles of Drainage Law" 
In Instruction No. 6, the court stated the Utah law 
with respect to acquisition of a prescriptive right-of-way. 
In Bertolina, et al, vs. Frates, 89 Utah 238, 57 P. (2d.) 
346, at page 348 of the Pacific Reporter, the court stated: 
"Where a person claims to have acquired an 
easement by prescription over another's land, he 
must show that he has acquired it by his own 
continuous, open, uninterrupted, and adverse 
user under claim of right for the twenty year 
prescriptive period. The prescriptive right is 
based originally upon the theory of a grant im-
plied from long use." 
See also Funk vs. Anderson, et al, 22 Utah 238, 61 
P. 1006. At page 1006 of Pacific Reporter, the court 
said: 
"This period unless other provision was made in 
the local statutes of the state in which the ques-
tions have arisen has been assumed to be twenty 
years. So that now an enjoyment of an easement 
for the term of twenty years raises a legal pr·e-
sumption that the right was originally acquired 
by title .... the presumption of a grant is the 
foundation of the doctrine of prescription, and 
is, in effect, the same, whether it arises because of 
an adverse user for a period of twenty years or, 
by analogy because of such user for the period 
prescribed by the statute of limitations." 
In Instruction No. 6, the court does set out the 
element of adverse use, and we quote from that portion 
of the instruction which sets it out: 
"2B. That the user of the right affecting the 
lands involved has made this use under a claim of 
right as against the owner of the land as con-
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trasted with a temporary permission of the 
owner." 
In addition, the other elements n'ecessary to obtain a 
right-of-way by prescription were set out by the court 
in this instruction. 
In Instruction No. 9, the court stated that defend-
ants claimed that Weber County acquired a right-of-
way for the drain across the property of plaintiffs and 
that this right-of-way was acquired as a result of ad-
verse use of the drain under a claim of right hostile to 
plaintiffs; it further stated that if Weber County used 
the drain with perinission or consent of plaintiffs, that 
Weber County could not acquire a right-of-way under 
such use; and further, that if the drain was used by 
Weber County without a claim or assertion of right to 
use the drain, that the use of the drain by W eb'er County 
would not be adverse and Weber County could not ac-
quire right-of-way under such use. This instruction 
merely elaborated on item 2B set out in the court's In-
struction No. 6 and was not in conflict therewith. 
The case of Smith vs. North Canyon Water Com-
pany, 16 Utah 194, 52 P. 283, cited by appellants, is not 
in point inasmuch as the court in that case discussed 
the elements n:ecessary to appropriate water by adverse 
possession under a particular statute then in force in 
Utah (Section 2783, Compiled Laws of Utah 1888) and 
did not discuss the elements necessary to gain a right-
of-way by prescription. 
Appellants' Point No. III is not well taken, as the 
court's Instruction No. 6 is a correct statement of law 
and was fully supported by the evidence, as shown by 
the transcript and as before set out. 
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POINT NO. IV. 
Appellants' Contention that the Trial Court 
Er:rred in Its Instruction No. 13, There Being No 
Evidenee at all in the Record to Support The 
Instruction 
Respondents' answer to this contention is two-fold. 
First, it is submitted that there was evidence in-
troduced at trial and in the record to the effect that 
Weber County and respondents were in part acting as 
agents or servants for Lester England, who had a right-
of-way for drainage and maintenance of the drain in 
question when they in fact cleaned the drain in N ovem-
ber of 1953. The following testimony, brought out at 
the trial, was sufficient so that it could not be ignored 
by the trial court and could have properly been con-
sidered by the jury. 
Mr. Lester England testified that he owned the farm 
land lying north of appellant Hance Taylor's land and 
running up to Center Street, abutting on the drain in 
question (T. 174, 175), and that the property had origin-
ally been his father's. His land had been drained 
through the Taylor drain for a period of over seventy-
five years (T. 186). His father and a Mr. 0. J. Swenson 
had purchased the rights from Grandad John A. Taylor, 
a prior owner of appellants' land, to drain the water 
from their lands through the Taylor drain (T. 187, 188, 
189, 190, 191). Shortly before November of 1953, Mr. 
England requested and authorized the County Com-
missioners and Weber County to clean the drain for 
him so that his water might run through (T. 204, 205 ). 
Mr. England stated that the ones he told to clean the 
33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
drain were the County road men, Co1n1nissioner Elmer 
Carver, and the man Griffin who drove the County 
draglin'e (T. 205 ). That respondents were authorized 
to clean the drain by and for l\lr. England was made 
clear when Mr. Christensen cross-examined him as to 
a conversation that he had with Com1nissioner Carver 
(T. 224). 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF :M:R. ErNGLAND 
BY MR. CHRISTENSEN: 
"A: I said, 'Go ahead and clean it out'. 
"Q: And he said he would~ 
"A: Witness nodded his head. 
"Q: So you at that time gave him p6-rmission 
to clean your drain, didn't you~ 
"A: Yes. 
"Q: Well, that was just before they went on 
the Taylor property, wasn't it 1 Just a few days 
before' 
"A: I think it was. They done some other 
work." 
On page 11 of appellants' brief and again on page 
20 under this point, it is stated that Commissioner 
Carver testified that the County did not act as agent 
for L'ester England in cleaning the drain. On page 11 
of appellants' brief, a part of Mr. Christensen's cross-
examination is set out to prove that Weber County was 
not acting in any way as agent for anyone else in clean-
ing the drain. If the preceding testimony of Com-
missioner Carver is added to that quoted by appellants, 
it corrcetly sets out what Commissioner Carver said. 
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CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHRISTENSEN: 
"Q : Now, you mentioned some of these land-
owners around there had b'een asking you to 
clean that drain. Were you cleaning the drain 
for those landowners 7 
"A: No, not primarily. The thing that 
brought it to a head, as I told you in my testimony 
the other day, is when Center Street road, which 
is a F'ederal project ... " (Here Mr. Carver was 
cut off by Mr. Christensen) (T. 323) 
and if added to this is the 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MR. CARVER 
BY MR. RICHARDS: 
"Q: Had you or had you not been instructed 
or ordered by other people up north of the Taylor 
land to clean the drain prior to the time you 
cleaned it7 
"A: Yes. 
"Q: Who had ordered you to do that 
"A: Mr. England, Mr. Christens'en, Mr. 
Gibby .... " (T. 324) 
it then becomes cl'ear that what Commissioner Carver 
was saying was that he had been instructed to clean 
the drain by Mr. England and others; that these in-
structions prompted part of the County's action but not 
all of it; that the Commissioners still checked the drain 
and determined that it did need cleaning, and when 
they cleaned it, it was primarily for Weber County, but 
at least partially because of the promptings of :Mr. 
England and others. 
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Although the support for the court's Instruction No. 
13 in the evidence may have been limited, it is not 
correct, as appellants state, that there is no evidence at 
all in the record to support it. Further, to say that 
Weber County 'expressly denied at trial that it was 
acting for anyone other than Weber County in cleaning 
the Taylor drain is not a correct statement of Com-
missioner Carver's testimony. 
Appellants' quotation on the law of instructions 
from the case of State Bank of Beaver County vs. 
Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P. 2d 612, is a good state-
ment of law but is not controlling in this case as ap-
pellants have attempted to apply it. It in fact sub-
stantiat~s the contention of r'espondents, as it states at 
page 432 of the Utah reports : 
"It is necessary, however, that whatever theories 
are presented by pleadings or otherwise, in order 
to be entitled to b'e submitted by way of instruc-
tions to the jury, some evidence must have been 
received by the court in support of such theory." 
(Italics ours) 
Had it proved necessary that the case be determined 
on the question of whether the defendants acted only 
through a righ,t-of-way owned by Lester England, then 
there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to make 
a determination as to wheth'er 1Ir. England had such a 
right-of-way and whether the County when they went 
upon the drain acted upon the instruction of Mr. England 
and as his servant or agent. The case of Jensen vs. 
Gerrard, et al, 39 P. (2d) 1070, 85 Utah 481, sup-
ports Lester England's theory of right-of-way through 
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the Taylor drain by asserting that an ineffectual parole 
grant may ripen into an easement by prescription. To 
do so, of course, it would require the advers1e use and 
enjoyment under claim of right, uninterrupted and con-
tinuous for twenty years. Mr. England's uncontroverted 
testimony established that these requisites had bleen met 
regarding his right-of-way. 
Second, for the second division of our argument, 
let us assume, as have counsel for appellants, that there 
is no evidence in the record to support Instruction No. 
13. Then, whether or not the giving of this instruc-
tion by the trial court was reversible error must be de-
termined under the Utah law by the further question 
of wh'ether or not it was prejudicial to appellants. 
The case of Pulsipher vs. Chinn (Schmutz, Inter-
venor), 255 P. 439, 69 Utah 401, held that although an 
instruction is shown to be clearly erroneous, it must 
still be shown to have been prejudicial before it will be 
considered as reversible error. 
In the case of Clawson vs. Walgreen Drug Company, 
et al, 162P. (2d) 759, 108 Utah 577, from which appellants 
have quoted at length from the concurring opinion of 
Justice Wolfe, it is interesting to note that in the case 
itself, thle trial court gave two erroneous instructions, 
neither of which, according to this court, was supported 
by evidence in the case. In this case, two interesting 
determinations were made concerning these instructions. 
Th'e first was that this court may look at the overall 
case and if it determines that the possibility was very 
remote that the jury took into consideration the fact 
erroneously placed before it by the court's instruction, 
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then the error in th'e improper instruction would not be 
prejudicial. The second determination was that where 
an erroneous fact is placed before the jury by an in-
struction not supported by the evidenc·e, then where all 
the other evidence in the case is sufficiently conelusive 
so that the jury might have reached its verdict without 
considering the facts 'erroneously placed before it, then, 
although the instruction was erroneous, this court may 
determine that the jury could not have been mislead by 
the instruction and therefore the error would not be 
pr'ejudicial. Justice Wolfe's concurring opinion in the 
Clawson case was quoted extensively in appellants' brief. 
The first of his "quotes" at the bottmn of page 21 of the 
brief is applicable to the facts of this case. 
Justice Wolfe's discussion and differentiation b'e-
tween prejudicial and non-prejudicial inapplicable in-
structions does not apply to the case at hand for the 
reason that clearly here, the matter was not prejudicial, 
and, s'econd, it is clear in this case that the jury dis-
regarded the instruction and did not rely on it in making 
their determination. 
In this case, the jury had before them the major and 
this minor theory of defendants' case, the major theory 
being that r'espondents had a right-of-way over the 
drain in question, obtained by prescription. The minor 
theory in question under this instruction, was that re-
spondents had a right to be on the drain in question by 
reason of agency through authority of Lester England. 
Three special interrogatories were given to and 
answered by the jury. The first one was : 
"Do you find from the evidence that Weber 
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County on November 20, 1953, had a right-of-way 
across th'e plaintiffs' Hance A. Taylor, Erma C. 
Taylor and Parley P. Taylor land for the purpose 
of draining water through the drain then existing 
on plaintiffs land and for cleaning and main-
taining that water drain 1 
"Answer yes or no" 
The jury's answer: "Yes" 
The second special interrogatory was: 
"If you answered Special Interrogatory No. 1 
yes, then do you find from tl1e evidence in this 
case that Weber County on November 20, 1953, 
enlarged said drain where it passes through the 
land of the plaintiffs Hance A. Taylor, Erma C. 
Taylor and Parley P. Taylor to a greater extent 
than tlleir right-of-way allowed 1 
"Answer yes or no" 
The jury's answer: "No" 
The third special interrogatory was not answered 
for the reason that the prior answer had been no. 
This clear and absolute determination by the jury 
that W'eber County had a right-of-way of its own 
through the drain and that the respondents did not ex-
ceed that right-of-way in their cleaning clearly estab-
lishes two things : 
First, that since respondents had a right-of-way 
of their own to do everything on the drain that they 
did, tllen the question of whether or not they were there 
also as agents of Lester England is immaterial, and since 
they had such a right-of-way of their own, then In-
struction No. 13, even though inapplicable and super-
fluous, would not be prejudicial to appellants. 
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Second, that Instruction No. 13 may be disregarded 
under th'e rule set forth in the Clawson vs. Walgreen 
case above cited for the reason that it is clear in this 
case that the jury in fact did disregard Instruction No. 
13 concerning agency as it was not necessary in the 
primary decision in the case. 
Counsel's statement of the law concerning instruc-
tions, set out on page 20 of appellants' brief and taken 
from 64 Corpus Juris 760 and 14 Ruling Case Law 736, 
is a correct statement of law but does not completely 
cover the question at hand. If appellants' statement is 
taken in conjunction with a statement found in 5 Corpus 
Juris Secundum at page 1118, the law applicable to this 
point is then before the court: 
"The giving of instructions which are abstract 
or not authorized or applicable to the pleadings 
and the evidence will not constitute a ground for 
reversal where no prejudice results to the com-
plaining party, and this is so whether or not the 
instructions state correct rules of law." 
The cases of Moore vs. Utah-Idaho Cent. R. Co., 
174 P. 873, 52 Utah 373, and Daley vs. Salt Lake and 
U. R. Co., 247 P. 293, 67 Utah 238, are cases supporting 
respondents' argument on this point that when error is 
made in instructing the jury, that error is harmless and 
may be disregarded wher'e it is clear that the matter 
is decided on another point. In 5 Corpus Juris Secun-
dum at page 1144 it is stated: 
"Giving an erroneous instruction is harmless 
error where the verdict shows that the jury dis-
regarded it." 
Again from 5 Corpus Juris Secundum at pages 
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1153 and 1154, under subsection (c) : 
"Where sp'ecial findings by the jury or a finding 
by them on one of a number of issues show that 
appellant was not injured by an instruction, 
errors therein will be deemed harmless." 
This Point No. IV of appellants' brief should not 
be sustained. It appears clear from the transcript that: 
(1) The instruction here in question was sufficiently 
supported by the evidence, and (2) In any event, the 
appellants could not have be'en prejudiced thereby, and 
any error would have been harmless as the jury clearly 
disregarded it in reaching a verdict. 
POINT NO. V. 
Appellants' Contention that the Trial Court 
Erred in His Refusal to Sustain the Objections 
to the Testimony of Witness Lester England, 
and Further Erred in Refusing Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Strike the Testimony of Witness Lester 
England as to Certain Matters 
Respondents contend that the court properly re-
fused to strike the testimony of witness Lester England. 
The testimony of Mr. England with respect to the con-
versation with his father concerning his purchase of a 
right-of-way through the drain in question (T. 187, 188, 
189, 190, 191), meets the tests set out in Wigmore on 
Evidence, Vol. 5, Sec. 1563 - 1571, (3d Ed.), concerning 
private boundaries: 
1. The declarent was deceased at the time Lester 
England testified concerning the conversation. 
2. Tile declaration was made prior to any actual or 
contemplated law suit concerning the drain. 
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3. The declarent was standing on the drain and on 
the land in question at the time he made the declaration. 
4. The declarent had no apparent Inotive or interest 
to misrepresent. 
5. The declarent appeared to have had knowledge 
of the boundaries of the drain in question. 
The fact that the boundary here in question was one 
bordering a right-of-way rather than around a field of 
land should not make a difference as appellants' brief 
. argues on page 26. 
In the case of Rush vs. Collins, 366 Ill. 307, 8 N. E. 
(2d) 659, at page 663 the court said: 
"It is contended, however, that th'e court erred 
in admitting in evidence conversations between 
the plaintiff and others, who were not in title 
to the Collins' property, and which conversations 
w'ere out of the presence of and not acquiesced in 
by the then owner of the Collins' property. Where 
long possession is relied upon to establish the 
right of a claimant to an easement, the same 
strict rules of evidence are not required as where 
a claim is founded on an ordinary title. The 
most usual character of evidence in such a case 
would be parol and not documentary. Conver-
sations will be found in cases of this character, 
either accompanying agre'ements or in explana-
tion of conditions which existed, which aid or 
tend to defeat the presumption, after twenty 
years, of the right to use the property or way. 
The evidence was competent for the limited pur-
pose of showing the character of the plaintiff's 
use of the alley, and there was no error in its 
admission." 
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The plaintiff testified that at the time he purchased 
the property adjoining the tract of land over which he 
claimed an easement he and the person from whom he 
was purchasing made inquiry from the defendants' pre-
decessor in interest concerning the alley in qu'estion and 
the defendant's predecessor in interest replied, "we 
made the all'ey years and years ago and you have been 
using it ever since. There is no question about the 
alley". 
Also, see Morris on vs. Noone, 78 N. H. 338, 100 At. 
45. The defendant claimed a right to flow the plaintiff's 
land by virtue of a verbal agr'eement made in 1854 by 
his father, his predecessor in title, with the owners of 
land above the dam, at which time a letter "H" was cut 
in a rock near the pond above the dam to mark the 
height to which th'e parties agreed that Noone might 
raise the water. Defendant also claimed a prescriptive 
right to flow the plaintiff's land. The defendant, at 
the trial, testified that his father told him that the mark 
"H" was the point to which he had the right to raise 
the water, and what Mr. Gallup, superintendent of the 
mill, told him as to the placing of the mark upon the 
rock. This testimony was objected to by the plaintiff. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court at page 46 of 
Atlantic Reporter had this to say regarding this testi-
mony: 
"The defendant claimed by prescription, and the 
statement that his father claimed that his right 
was to raise the water to the mark "H" was 
original evidence of the claim made by the de-
fendant's ancestor in title. The evidence was 
also admissable as the declaration as to the 
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boundary of his real 'estate right by one now de-
ceased having at the time the means of know-
ledge and no interest to misrepresent. 1,hough 
Gallup was not an owner of the land, it was in 
evidence that he was conn'ected with the mill for 
several years as superintendent. It could be he 
had the means of knowledge and was without 
interest to misrepres'ent, and after his decea~r 
his statements identifying the mark on the rock 
as a monument bounding the right of flowage 
were admissable." 
However, even if we assum'e that the said testimony 
of Lester England was inadmissable and incompetent, 
then the following question must be answered: Was the 
testimony prejudicial to the app'ellants ~ 
The law without any question is that the erroneous 
admission of evidence is not reversible error unless it 
is prejudicial. Schofield vs. Zion's Co-op Mercantile 
Inst., 85 Utah 281, 39 P. (2d) 342; 96 A. L. R. 1083; 
Knowlton vs. Thompson, 62 Utah 142, 218 P. 117; 3 Am. 
Juris., Sec. 1027, page 576. 
Also, where the verdict of the jury otherwise 
renders immaterial, as regards the appellant, the issue 
upon which alone such evidence was admitted and used, 
the error is harmless. 
The questioning of Letser England (T. 187-191) 
concerning th'e conversation with his father was with 
regard to his ownership and purchase from John A 
Taylor of a right-of-way to the drain in question and 
also the boundary of said right-of-way, and there was 
no testimony or inference from Lester England or any 
other witness that such right-of-way was transferred or 
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desc'ended from his father to Weber County, as appel-
lants agree on page 28. 
As has previously been mentioned under Point No. 
IV, defendants had a major and minor theory concern-
ing their right to clean the drain in question, their 
major theory b'eing that they had a right-of-way by 
prescription, and their minor theory being that by reason 
of agency through authority of Lester England, they 
had a right to clean the drain. Through answering 
"yes" to the first special interrogatory before set out, 
the jury found that Weber County had a right-of-way 
through the drain and that they did not exceed the 
right-of-way in their cleaning thereof. Therefore, the 
question of whether or not they were acting through th'e 
agency of Lester England would be immaterial, and any 
testimony of a right-of-way owned by Lester England 
or his father would also be immaterial, and there could 
b'e no prejudice to appellants as a result of said testi-
mony. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the Taylor drain is and has 
since pioneer times been the natural course of drainage 
for land lying to the north, east, and west. Weber 
County, by prescription, has acquired a right-of-way 
for drain purposes along this drain wher'e it runs 
through the land of appellants. Landowners to the 
north of appellants have acquired by purchase and con-
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tinned use the right to drain their water through thiE 
drain. Respondents, in cleaning the drain, did not ex-
ceed their right-of-way and did no damage to appellant~' 
land. The trial court properly exrercised its discretion 
in giving its instructions and receiving evidence. The 
appellants were in no way injured or prejudiced. 
This court should therefor'e affirm the judgement 
of the district court. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
MAURICE RICHARDS 
MAXD. LAMPH 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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